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The Issues of Differentiation of Constitutional Policy from Ongoing Politics
 
 
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1
associate professor at the Chair of Constitutional Law of Yerevan State University, Armenia
Дата публикации: 2019-12-17
 
Studia Politologiczne 2019;52
 
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА:
СТАТЬЯ:
The article considers the issues of differentiation of constitutional policy from ongoing politics. The author concludes that Constitution and politics should have one main common aim – regulation of social relations via guaranteeing the principle of rule of law. The Constitution should be not a tool for politics, but a bound, framework for it. Moreover, the constitutional developments should express not the current political preferences and interests, but be superior to them and define fundamental legal framework for political actors and events. In other words, constitutional policy should be clearly differentiated from the current politics, and the Constitution should be not a part of the ongoing political game, but should have a role of defining the rules of that game. The Constitution should not be subject to amendment parallel to every change of political situation of the state or formation of a new political majority. The Basic Law has a fundamental role from the aspect of regulating social relations and can’t be used just as a tool for solving ongoing political problems. It is a symbol of a concrete constitutional system, and should in reality be perceived as such.
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Article has been screened for originality
 
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ISSN:1640-8888