

Olena Yatsunska

**The impact of changes in electoral systems:
a comparative analysis of the local election
in Ukraine in 2006 and 2010**

KEY WORDS:

*local government, local elections, proportional electoral system,
majoritarian electoral system, mixed majoritarian-proportional electoral
system, Ukraine*

Having gained independence in 1991 Ukraine, like most Central and Eastern European countries, faced the need for radical Constitutional reforms, with reorganization of local government figuring high in the agenda. Like other post-soviet countries, Ukraine had to decide on the starting point and like in the neighboring countries, democratic euphoria of the early 1990s got the upper hand: local authorities were elected on March 18, 1990, while the Law On Local People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR and Local Self-government was adopted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukrainian SSR on December 7, 1990. Ukrainian Researchers in the field of local government and its reforms concur with the opinion that the present dissatisfactory state of that institution was conditioned by the first steps made by Ukrainian Politicians at the beginning of the 'transition' period. Without clear perspective of reform, during more than 20 years of Independence, Ukrainian local government has abided dozens of laws, sometimes rather contradictory and has survived more than 10 stages of restructuring.

Evolution of election legislation in Ukraine is demonstrated by Table 1.

The table shows that since 1994 three electoral systems have been tested in Ukraine: 1, Majoritarian, 2, Proportional except elections to village and settlement councils and 3, 'Mixed' system (50% Majoritarian+50% Proportional).

Majoritarian Electoral System, being a Soviet legacy and a cumbersome, expensive system that hampered the formation of an effective local party system,

Table 1. Evolution of the Local Election Law in Ukraine

	1994 (law # 3 996-XII, authorized 02/24/1994)	1998, 2002 (law # 14/98-R, authorized 01/14/1998)	2006 (law # 1667-IV, authorized 04/06/2004)	2010 (law # 2487-VI, authorized 07/10/2010; # 2491-VI, authorized 08/30/2010)
Electoral System	– Majoritarian system	Village and settlement councils, and heads of village, settlement, and city councils are elected based on majoritarian system Deputies of district, district in cities, city and oblast councils, and Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are elected on the basis of proportional system	Majoritarian-proportional system – half of the deputies (overall seats) of the respective council are elected by list of candidates of local and political party organizations in multiseat electoral constituency; – half of the deputies (overall seats) of the respective council are elected by winner-take-all system in single-seat electoral constituency	
Term of service for Heads and Members of Councils	4 years	5 years	5 years	5 years
Passive electoral rights restrictions	One person cannot simultaneously run for the Head of the Council and for a Council Member seat	A candidate can run only for one Council Member seat or for the Head of Village, Settlement or City Council	A candidate can simultaneously run for Member seats in different Councils and for the Head of the Council	A candidate for the Member seat in multiseat electoral constituency can run simultaneously for Member seat in the respective Council in single-seat electoral constituency or for the Head of Village, Settlement or City Council A candidate for Member seat in single-seat majoritarian electoral constituency, for Head of Village, Settlement or City Council cannot run simultaneously for Member seat in other single-seat electoral constituencies or single-seat majoritarian electoral constituencies

	1994 (law # 3 996-XII, authorized 02/24/1994)	1998, 2002 (law # 14/98-R, authorized 01/14/1998)	2006 (law # 1667-IV, authorized 04/06/2004)	2010 (law # 2487-VI, authorized 07/10/2010; # 2491-VI, authorized 08/30/2010)
Number of Council Member seats	Seats depend on a number of voters	City Councils seats are based on a number of voters Oblast Councils seats are equally divided among the districts	Seats depend on a number of voters Constituencies with more than 2 million people may have up to 150 members in a respective Council	A candidate can run for Member seat, Head of Village, Settlement or City Council from only one local political party organization Seats depend on a number of voters Constituencies with more than 2 million people may have from 76 to 150 members in a respective Council Oblast Councils seats are equally divided among the districts regardless of the number of the voters in the respective constituency Overall member seats of the respective council must be even-numbered
Right to nominate belongs to:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voter gatherings; - Political parties, movements and electoral blocks; - Public organizations - Labor unions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voter gatherings by place of residence, work, or education; - Local organizations, political parties, electoral blocks (which can nominate independent candidates as well); - Public organizations, registered under Ukrainian law; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local party organizations/blocks, registered at least one year prior to the elections (which can nominate independent candidates as well); - Self-nomination (must file a petition to appropriate territorial electoral commission supported by a certain number of signatures). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local party organizations; - Self-nomination (for Village and Settlement Councils and their Heads)

		<p>– Self-nomination (must file a petition to appropriate territorial commission and submit a certain number of signatures).</p> <p>– No monetary fee</p>		<p>No monetary fee</p> <p>Total abolition of limits for electoral funds of parties and candidates</p>
<p>Financial requirements for registration</p>	<p>All candidates must deposit a refundable monetary fee if they receive more than 5% of votes</p>			<p>Elected candidate in a single-seat electoral constituency or as the Head of village, settlement or city councils, is a candidate who received a majority of votes;</p> <p>Elected candidate in a multiseat electoral constituency is a candidate who is included in the electoral list of local party organization/block, which received more than 3% of votes</p>
<p>Defining the winners</p>	<p>Elected candidate for both Council Member seat and the Head of the Council is the one who received the majority of votes by no less than 10% of votes</p> <p>Elected candidate for the Head of the Council cannot receive less than 25% of votes</p>	<p>Elected candidate for both Council Member seat and the Head of the Council is the one who received the majority of votes</p> <p>Elected candidate in a multiseat electoral constituency is a candidate who is included in the electoral list of local party organization/block, which received more than 3% of votes.</p> <p>Council Member seats are proportionally divided between the electoral lists of local organized parties/blocks based on the number of votes received by elected candidates, including in the electoral lists</p>		

was in practice in Ukraine throughout three electoral cycles. Apparently, when adopting Law on Elections in 2006, Ukrainian deputies pinned their hopes on the Proportional system as a miracle cure for local government. It was supposed to bring the Ukrainian system closer to the European standards of local government. Almost all of the countries in Western and Eastern Europe now practise the Proportional electoral system on the local level. This system can reduce the number of political parties, while promoting their growth and maintaining the role of the remaining ones in politicizing and structuring of society. The Proportional system was expected to ensure better representation of main political preferences of Ukrainian citizens on the local level and place more responsibilities on political parties for their local activities; to implement the model of local government based on “strong mayor – strong council” system (as opposed to “strong mayor – weak council” system); to enable creation of steady seat majorities in local councils controlling respective local functions, and weaken the influence of administrative bureaucracies on elections’ results.

However, adoption of Proportional system for local elections in Ukraine proved to have negative rather than positive consequences. As it turned out, the ‘Achilles heel’ of the new system were closed lists revealing to voters information only about the top five members of each party. This made it possible for almost all Ukrainian political parties to enroll so-called ‘fat cats’ who, according to different reports, paid from \$100,000 to \$800,000 for ‘sure-to-get-in seats’¹ [1], with City Council seats being more popular than Regional Councils. The reason for such popularity was rather mercenary. All the profitable issues like land distribution, privatization, etc. remained under the authority of the City Council.

It should be also stressed that according to the Law “On the Status of Deputies of Local Councils”², deputies do not get salary for their deputy services (art. 6). One could wonder what makes candidates pay through the nose for a deputy seat. Is it an urge to advance the functioning of local community or greed for gain? The answer is obvious.

Closed lists also enabled practically all political parties involved to engage ‘locomotive’ technology, that is when the top of the list is filled with celebrities

¹ O. Yatsunska, *Will New Electoral System Lead to the Revolution of the Local Government in Ukraine?*, «Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe» 2006, № 6, Vol. 21, pp. 523–537.

² Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Zakon Ukrainy Pro Vnesennya Zmin do Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro Status Deputativ Mistevykh Rad,”* [Law of Ukraine About Making Changes in the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of Deputies of Local Councils”], 2005, № 51, art. 552, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi>, 15.04.2014.

who subsequently refuse their seats, and as a result dark horse candidates from the end of the list ('carriages') get into the local bodies. As a rule, such candidates have little to do with the local community; they know nothing about its wants and needs and consequently bear no responsibility for their activity to the members of that community.

Illustrative examples of such tendencies are the results of a survey carried out by the Union of Young Political Scientists of Ukraine after the elections in Kharkiv³. According to their report, 82 out of 100 deputies of the 5th City Council were unknown to the city residents. One more interesting result of the survey was the fact that the most popular among Kharkiv dwellers – 2% (!) – were 18 deputies including the Secretary of the City Council G. Kernes, head of "Our Ukraine" [Nasha Ukraina]⁴, faction A. Rudenko, deputy for the BYuT⁵ faction S. Semochkin, deputy for the Party of Regions faction and S. Kushnarev, brother of the ex-governor of Kharkiv region E. Kushnarev⁶.

Analysis of the 2006-2010 post-electoral cycle shows that formation of the local representative bodies on the basis of proportional system with closed lists resulted in excessive partization.

Experts conjectured that active participation of parties in local government would boost publicity and promote the formation of a capable and efficient system of municipal administration. However, legislation at the time brought about confrontation between the mayor and most of the City Council deputies as representatives of different political parties, as well as opposition between elected local administration and regional administration appointed by the President (see Table 2).

Table 2 demonstrates that with the exception of the Donetsk and Luhansk City Councils, where the power was monopolized by representatives of Party of Regions (84% and 80.2% of deputies respectively), after the 2006 Elections in practically all administrative centers there was a great chance the majority would become opposed to the mayor and bloc his decisions or even dismiss him by a two thirds majority.

³ Kharkiv is the second-largest city of Ukraine, the first capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1917-1934). Located in the north-east of the country.

⁴ "Our Ukraine" is a centre-right political party of Ukraine formed in 2005. The party supported former President Viktor Yushchenko.

⁵ BYuT – Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc of Parties.

⁶ *Wikipedia*, "Kharkivska Miska Rada" [Kharkiv Local Council], http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Харківська_міська_рада#V_28XXV.29_.D1.81.D0.BA.D0.BB.D0.B8.D0.BA.D0.B0.D0.BD.D0.BD.D1.8F, 15.04.2014.

Table 2. Political Climate in Local City Councils in 2006

Regional Administrative Centre	Mayor, Political parties which backed him up in the elections	Majority in the City Council
Vinnitsa	Volodymyr Hroisman, Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc (Our Ukraine) (OUPS)	BYuT – 27 (54%) OUPS – 8 (16%)
Dnipropetrovsk	Ivan Kulichenko, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) and SPU (Socialist Party of Ukraine)	PR – 45 (37.5%) BYuT – 21 (17.5%)
Donetsk	Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, Party of Regions (PR)	PR – 68 (84%) Vitrenko Bloc – 13 (16%)
Zhytomyr	Vira Sheludchenko, OUPS	BYuT – 19 (31.67%) OUPS – 12 (20%)
Ivano-Frankivsk	Viktor Anushkevitchus, UPB (Ukrainian People’s Bloc) Kostenko-Plushch	OUPS – 22 (36.67%) BYuT – 17 (28.3%)
Zaporizhia	Yevhen Kartashov, PR	PR – 43 (47.7%) BYuT – 15 (16.6%)
Kirovohrad	Valeriy Kalchenko, BYuT (refused his position in favor of the seat in Verkhovna Rada, May 25,2006) Volodymyr Puzakov, CPU, BYuT (elected November 26, 2006, officially appointed February 1, 2007)	BYuT – 36 (47.37%) PR – 10 (13.16%)
Kyiv	Leonid Chernovetskyi, was backed up by OUPS, was re-elected as mayor in early election May 28, 2008	BYuT – 41 (34%) Chernovetskyi Bloc – 21 (17.5%)
Luhansk	Serhiy Kravchenko, PR	PR – 61 (80.2%) Vitrenko Bloc – 7 (9.2%)
Lutsk	Bohdan Shyba, BYuT, OUPS	BYuT – 23 (51%) OUPS – 11 (24%)
Lviv	Andriy Sadovyi, OUPS, “Pora – PRP”	OUPS – 32 (35.5%) BYuT – 25 (27%)
Mykolayiv	Volodymyr Chaika, PR, BYuT, SPU	PR – 45 (50%) Vitrenko Bloc – 15 (16.6%)
Odesa	Eduard Hurvits, OUPS	PR – 38 (31.6%) Hurvits Bloc – 31 (25.8%)
Poltava	Mayor not elected at the time of elections Andriy Matkovskiy, BYuT (November 26, 2006.)	BYuT – 19 (38%) PR – 17 (34%)

Regional Administrative Centre	Mayor, Political parties which backed him up in the elections	Majority in the City Council
Rivne	Viktor Chaika , OUPS (died February 2008.) Volodymyr Khomko , «Reforms and Oder», PGU, UPP (Ukrainian People's Party) (December 1, 2008)	BYuT (32%) OUPS (28.3%)
Sevastopol	Valeriy Saratov, PR	PR – 45 (60%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (12%)
Simferopol	Hennadiy Babenko, PR	For Yanukovych Bloc – 37 (48.69%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (11.85%)
Sumy	Hennadiy Minaev, Non-governmental organization 'Night watch'	BYuT – 36 (48%) Night Watch – 20 (26.67%)
Ternopil	Roman Zastavnyi, OUPS, SPU	BYuT – 22 (36.6%) OUPS – 17 (28.3%)
Uzhhorod	Serhiy Ratushnyak, Litvin Bloc	BYuT – 17 (34%) OUPS – 12 (24%)
Kharkiv	Mikhail Dobkin, PR	PR – 54 (54%) BYuT – 14 (14%)
Kherson	Volodymyr Saldo, PR	PR – 22 (28.95%) BYuT – 20 (26.32%)
Khmelnyskyi	Serhiy Melnik, BYuT	BYuT – 24 (40%) Mykola Prytula Bloc – 12 (20%)
Cherkasy	Mayor not elected at the time of elections Serhiy Odarych, BYuT (November 5, 2006)	BYuT – 26 (43.34%) OUPS – 8 (13.34%)
Chernihiv	Mykola Rudkivsyi , SPU (refused his position in favor of the seat in Verkhovna Rada) Oleksandr Sokolov , PR (November 2006.)	BYuT – 18 (36%) PR – 10 (20%)
Chernivtsi	Mykola Fedoruk, BYuT	BYuT – 24 (40%) OUPS – 14 (23.3%)

For example, Mykolayiv Mayor V. Chayka was twice nearly dismissed. In October 2006 he was involved in a conflict with the local council regarding the sale of the Exhibition Center 'EKSPON-Mykolayiv'⁷. In January 2008 two major factions of the City Council, the Party of Regions and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc initiated the Mayor's retirement blaming him for violating the law by leasing out

⁷ *Mer Mykolaeva Vyrishyv Pity* [The Mayor of Mykolayiv Decided to Leave the Office], Korrespondent.Net, 2006, October 2, <http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/276725>, 15.04.2014.

the largest city park – “Victory Park” (“Park Pobedy”). Deputies demanded a prosecutor’s investigation and the dismissal of Chayka. BYuT insisted on the Mayor’s voluntary retirement, or a dismissal by a two-thirds voter majority. There were even talks about balloting the mayor’s impeachment at city referendum⁸. However the matter did not get any further than the talking stage, and Volodymyr Chayka not only kept his position for the term but also was re-elected the Mayor in 2010.

An opposite situation arose after the elections in Zakarpattia⁹ where in spring 2007 two thirds of the Uzhhorod City Council deputies voted for devolution of authority to the mayor, out of fear that the City Council would be declared legally incompetent after implementing an imperative mandate to particular political parties¹⁰.

Experts believed that the adoption of that decision would not only give the charismatic Mayor Ratushnyak the chance to initiate and accelerate council dismissal by drawing out the deputies subordinated to him, but also would enable him to take control through Executive Committee with council powers all the vital issues of the community.

It should be noted, however, that the situation in Uzhhorod contradicts the Law of Ukraine on Local Self-government that stipulates that the exclusive authority of the City Council cannot be delegated to executive committee.

Table 2 also demonstrates the landslide of particular political forces in many local councils which pre-determines ground for conflicts because the minority can be neglected in the decision-making process¹¹.

Ukrainian legislation endows local councils with wide financial and fiscal powers. They have the right to approve local budget, socio-cultural and special-purpose programs; make decisions on allocation, sale, short and long-term lease of land plots; give municipal building license; impose local taxes with rates fixed by law; alienate municipal property; approve local privatization programs and the list of objects not liable to privatization; found, liquidate, reorganize and restructure businesses and organizations of communal property.

Advocates of the Proportional System insisted before 2006 Elections that partization of local councils would eventually put an end to municipal corruption. Unfortunately, their forecast proved wrong. Quite the contrary, parties initiated

⁸ *Uderzitsa li Chayka na Postu Mera?* [Will Chayka Remain As Mayor?], Pravda.mk.ua, 2008, February 20, http://www.pravda.mk.ua/news/analytics_and_comments/2008/02/20/42291.html, 15.04.2014.

⁹ Zakarpattia is located in Western part of Ukraine, which borders Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, and makes up part of the Pannonian Plain.

¹⁰ O. Yatsunska, *Less Than They Promised: Unexpected Consequences of the Reform of Local Self-government in Ukraine*, «The Crossroads, The Journal for the Studies of East European Borderland» 2012, № 3–4, pp. 277–301.

¹¹ For illustrative purposes we presented correlation between two major factions in City Councils

political cartels in regional and city councils, that is to say, the formation of classical ‘political machines’¹², that actively started to divide local property and offices after the elections.

We have witnessed a rather fascinating phenomenon – striking pacts between political opponents on the grounds of common business interests and real cooperation. Records suggest that such ‘marriages’ last as long as they are profitable for both sides.

The ability of small groups of people mostly comprised of officials, politicians and businessmen to take advantage of government bodies in order to privatize public welfare by means of illegal and behind-the-scene activities became known in scientific literature as ‘State Capture’.

Examples of ‘State Capture’ on the local level are regrettably ample and include privatization schemes such as leasing community property on favorable terms, illegal land distribution, behind-the-scenes allocation of budget funds and successful tenders, creating profit-making companies attached to municipal budget enterprises, etc. However, after 2006 Elections ‘State Capture’ in Ukraine acquired a party ‘flavor’. Political parties began to actively lobby not only party interests but also the interests of different financial groups. The Mykolayiv 5th City Council can serve as an illustration. Out of 90 mandates 45 belonged to members of the faction of Party of Regions. Because of their advantage no decision, especially on cases in which the land distribution was involved, was made without their consent. In addition to that party faction, there was another major group in the City Council: 43 representatives of city business circles that included entrepreneurs, managers of state and commercial organizations. They comprised 47.7% of the overall seats (for reference, in 2002 such ‘business segment’ in the City Council made up 23.4%¹³) and were members of different political parties – 20% of the deputies represented the Party of Regions, 6 deputies – BYuT and 6 – “Mykolayiv for Volodymyr Chayka” Bloc [Mykolayiv Za Volodymyra Chayku]¹⁴, 5 – Nataliya Vitrenko Bloc¹⁵, 4 – Party of Greens of Ukraine [Partiya Zelenykh Ukrainy] (PGU), 2 – Communist Party of Ukraine [Komunistychna

¹² Concept of ‘political machines’ was first described by J.C. Scott, *How they work in post-Soviet space*, including Ukraine see: K. Zimmer, *The Comparative Failure of Machine Politics*, Administrative Resources and Fraud, Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes Vol. XLVII, No. 1–2, September-December 2005, pp. 361–384.

¹³ O. Yatsunskaya, *Nikolaev ot Perestroyki k Nezavisimosti: Istoriko-Politicheskiy Analiz* [Nikolaev From Perestroyka to Independence: Historical and Political Analysis], Nikolaev VART, Shamray 2008.

¹⁴ “Mykolayiv for Volodymyr Chayka” Bloc united Party Reform and Order (PRO) and Democratic Party of Ukraine (DemPU).

¹⁵ Nataliya Vitrenko Bloc united (Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) and Russian-Ukrainian Union Party (RUS)

Partiya Ukrainy] (CPU)¹⁶. Each of these political forces were identified as complicit in dividing and distributing municipal property, and again, the examples are ample. A simple Internet search of Mykolayiv City Council decisions will provide plenty of evidence especially if any deputies' name is entered¹⁷.

Unfortunately, situations, like the one in Mykolayiv, are not unique. After the 2006 Elections 'State Capture' became customary practice in all Ukrainian regions. In our opinion, this phenomenon considerably weakens and undermines the prestige, integrity and most importantly the voters confidence and trust in local government. Moreover, the general public now has all the grounds to talk about corruption in local government bodies and the process of merging of government and business. Therefore, the Proportional System proved to be Pandora's Box rather than a magic cure for the Ukrainian local government. Therefore adoption of the new Law on Local Elections that came into effect in July 2010¹⁸ was only logical and predictable. The Elections were scheduled on October 31, 2010.

According to the new Law, regional, city and district councils are elected on the basis of a Mixed System: 50% of the deputy seats are elected by Majoritarian winner-take-all system and 50% by the Proportional System, with closed lists. Such a Majoritarian-Proportional system is not a novelty. This electoral formula proved to be an unbeaten track record for Ukraine in the 1998 and 2002 Elections for Verkhovna Rada. Most experts came to the conclusion that the new Law struck a compromise between the two practices of the past¹⁹.

The main distinction between the new 2010 electoral system and previous systems was the regulation on nominating candidates to local councils of all levels as well as to the seat of the Head of the City Council exceptionally by local party organizations. Moreover, it was not clear until August 30, 2010 whether the political parties registered less than a year before the start of the campaign could take part in the elections. Also little was understood about the principles of the organizations and the work of the election commissions. Other distinctions of the 2010 Elections were shortening of the term of the campaign to 50 days, the ban of party blocs to participate in the elections, and the cancellation of self-nomination for candidates.

¹⁶ O. Yatsunska, *Nikolaev ot Perestroyki k Nezavisimosti: Istoriko-Politicheckiy Analiz* [Nikolaev From Perestroyka to Independence: Historical and Political Analysis], Nikolaev VART, Shamray 2008.

¹⁷ O. Yatsunska, *Less Than They Promised: Unexpected Consequences of the Reform of Local Self-government in Ukraine*, «The Crossroads, The Journal for the Studies of East European Borderland» 2012, № 3-4, pp. 277–301.

¹⁸ The draft legislation was submitted for consideration in Verkhovna Rada by Oleksandr Yefremov(Party of Regions) and was voted for by 264 people's deputies.

¹⁹ V. Melnichenko, *Prymysova Partyzatsiya Mistsevogo Samovryaduvannya: Sutnist, Prychyny, Naslidky* [Forced Partition of Local Government: The Nature, Causes, Consequences], «Ukrainskiy Sotsium. Naukovy Zhurnal» 2010, № 4, pp. 187–200.

In what way did Majoritarian-Proportional electoral system affect local government? Regrettably, similar to the Proportional System, the Mixed System attracted a good deal of criticism from experts and international observers, as well as politicians, who believed that its major fault was in the exclusive right of political parties for nomination of candidates.

According to official reports, in 2010 there were 182 parties in Ukraine, registered in terms that allowed their participation in the elections²⁰.

Experience has proven that registration of political parties in Ukraine is an avalanche-like process, boosted by looming elections and changes in the electoral system. Table 3 proves this by displaying political parties' growth dynamics from 2004 to 2012 – from Law of Ukraine #1667-IV which put into effect Proportional System to Elections for Verkhovna Rada based on the Majoritarian-Proportional system. The table presents national level and several regional administrative centers in different parts of Ukraine (see Table 3).

It is obvious that the party creation peak falls on 2005 and 2009, right before local and parliamentary elections. The table shows that during 2004-2012 from 83 to 111 parties were registered on both national and local levels but, as experts point out, none of them were ideological, as most of the newly created parties were 'phantom' ones²¹.

Ukraine, however, is not a record-holder in Europe on the number of political parties. Among the 'champions' are Spain with 3251 parties registered in 2009, France – 269 parties (2007), Hungary – 141 parties (2009) and Germany – 112 parties (2011)²².

The main problem, though, is not the quantity but the quality of the political parties. A Survey of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov shows that 62% of Ukrainians believe that political parties do not fulfill the function they are supposed to in a democratic society, but are an actual instrument for bringing to power representatives of financial industrial groups and some politicians²³. It is not surprising, that Ukrainian political parties are seriously lacking in credibility.

²⁰ *Wikipedia*, "Politychni Partii Ukrainy" [Political Parties of Ukraine], http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Політичні_партії_України, 15.04.2014.

²¹ *Partiyna Systema Ukrainy: Osoblyvosti Stanovlennya, Problemy Funktsionuvannya, Tendentsii Evolyutsii* [Party System of Ukraine: The Peculiarities of Formation, Functioning Problems, Trends of Evolution], «*Natsionalna Bezpeka I Oborona*» 2010, № 5, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD116_ukr_1.pdf, 15.04.2014.

²² *Iybory – Partii – Politychni Rukhi* [Elections – Parties – Political Movements], «*Laboratoriya Zakonodavchyykh Initsiatyv*», [http://parlament.org.ua/upload/docs/KD-7\(ALI\).pdf](http://parlament.org.ua/upload/docs/KD-7(ALI).pdf), 15.04.2014.

²³ *Partiyna Systema Ukrainy: Osoblyvosti Stanovlennya, Problemy Funktsionuvannya, Tendentsii Evolyutsii* [Party System of Ukraine: The Peculiarities of Formation, Functioning Problems, Trends of Evolution], «*Natsionalna Bezpeka I Oborona*» 2010, № 5, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD116_ukr_1.pdf, 15.04.2014.

Table 3. Political Parties' Growth Dynamics from 2004 to 2012

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total:
Vinnitsa Region	5	29	4	10	7	16	11	7	10	99
Donetsk Region	5	24	8	8	7	17	9	8	10	96
Zhytomyr Region	6	33	5	8	9	18	8	7	6	100
Zakarpattia (Uzhhorod)	8	30	6	5	8	16	8	8	4	93
Ivano-Frankivsk Region	6	28	3	6	6	13	10	10	3	85
Rivne Region	6	23	4	6	7	14	9	6	11	86
Kharkiv Region	5	29	4	12	9	16	11	12	10	108
Kherson Region	5	28	4	8	7	12	27	8	9	108
Cherkasy Region	4	27	5	6	7	17	6	9	12	93
Chernihiv Region	9	28	6	9	6	16	8	10	12	104
Chernivtsi Region	6	22	2	7	7	13	12	8	6	83
Total Ukraine	7	24	11	4	18	12	13	15	7	111

An important factor influencing people's attitude of political parties is compliance of parties' activity with their programs and the way they stick to their election promises. This factor comes first in the hierarchy of the motifs for voting for proper political parties²⁴. However, the results of the survey made by the Razumkov Centre in 2010 show that 38.5% to 54.2% of respondents could not name any political power in the Parliament of the fifth convocation that kept all their pre-election promises²⁵.

²⁴ Yu. Yakymenko, *Gromadska Dumka Yak Faktor Evolyutsii Partiinoi Systemy Ukrainy* [Public Opinion as a Factor of Evolution of the Party System of Ukraine], Tsentr Razumkova 2010, July 16, http://www.uceps.org/upload/yakymenko_parties_public_op.pdf, 15.04.2014.

²⁵ Yu. Yakymenko, *Gromadska Dumka Yak Faktor Evolyutsii Partiinoi Systemy Ukrainy* [Public Opinion as a Factor of Evolution of the Party System of Ukraine], Tsentr Razumkova 2010, July 16, http://www.uceps.org/upload/yakymenko_parties_public_op.pdf, 15.04.2014.

These figures not only explain the reason for the drop in the level of credibility to parties but also clearly display people's disappointment in the leading actors in the political field, those being parties that are invariably represented in power or are leading competitors. This tendency gave experts reason to talk about springing demand in Ukraine for new political parties – parties with a clear program and ideology, parties with coherent policy and responsibility towards voters, parties functioning effectively not only in the center but at the local level as well. That is to say, these new parties should completely differ from existing political structures.

Some of the parties that can be classified as such relatively new parties are UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform) of Vitali Klitschko²⁶, "Civil Position" [Grazhdanska Pozytsiya] (A. Hrytsenko), "Strong Ukraine" [Sylna Ukraina] (S. Tyhypko), All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom" [Vseukrayinske obyednannia "Svoboda"] (O. Tyahnybok), "Front for Change" [Front Zmin] (A. Yatsenyuk), and they successfully challenged so-called old parties. Political landscape in 2006 and 2010 in regional city councils of Ukraine, Simferopol and Sevastopol is represented in Table 4.

Table 4 also demonstrates that after the 2010 Elections the structure of city councils was virtually renewed by two thirds. In many regions deputy mandates were won by representatives of little-knowns in the centre local parties which gained support of local voters: Russian Bloc [Ruski Bloc], "Russian Unity" [Ruska Yednist], "Union" [Soyuz] in the Crimea; "Ukraine of the Future" [Ukraina Maybutnogo] in Dnipropetrovsk; "Conscience of Ukraine" [Sovist Ukrainy] in Vinnytsya and Poltava; "Hometown" [Ridne Misto] in Zhitomir Region and in Sumy; All-Ukrainian Patriotic Union [Vseukrayinsky Patriotychny Soyuz] in Rivne; "For Ukraine!" [Za Ukrainu!] in Lutsk; "Women's Solidarity" [Solidarnist Zhinok], "Solidarity" [Solidarnist] in Kirovohrad; "Motherland" [Vitchyzna] in Odesa; "Party of Free Democrats" [Partiya Vilnykh Demokrativ], All-Ukrainian Political Party – "Ecology and Social Protection" [Vseukrayinska Politychna Partiya – Ekologiya ta Sotsialny Zakhyst] in Cherkasy; "Civil Solidarity" [Gromadyanska Solidarnist] in Chernihiv; "Ecological Recovery Party "Eco +25%" [Partiya Ekologichnogo Poryatunku "EKO+25%"], "Youth Party of Ukraine" [Molodizhna Partiya Ukrainy] in Uzhhorod. It is interesting to note, that in Zakarpattia some local parties were oriented toward the voters in the areas of compact settlement of ethnic minorities – "Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine" [Democratychna Partiya Ugortsiv Ukrainy] and "KMKS Party of Hungarians of Ukraine" [KMKS "Partiya Ugortsiv Ukrainy] – which became real peculiarity of the election campaign in that region.

²⁶ Vitali Klitschko is a Ukrainian professional boxer and the reigning WBC heavyweight champion. He is leader of the political party Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform and since 15 December 2012, a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Table 4. Representation of Political Parties in Regional City Councils, Simferopol and Sevastopol in 2006 and 2010

Representation of political parties and majority in the City Council		Factions in City Council 2013	
Regional Administrative Centre	2006	2010	
Vynnytsia	7 political parties BYuT – 17 (34%) OUPS – 8 (16%) SPU – 5 (10%) PR – 4 (8%) USDP – 3 (6%) CPU – 2 (4%) Viche – 2 (4%) Nonpartisan – 9 (18%)	7 political parties “Conscience of Ukraine” – 33 (66%) / 23 m.c. ²⁷ PR – 5 (10%) / 2 m.c. “Fatherland” – 5 (10%) “Freedom” – 2 (4%) UDAR – 2 (4%) “Front for Change” (FC) – 2 (4%) “Strong Ukraine” (SU) – 1 (2%)	Total: 3 “Conscience of Ukraine” – 33 PR – 6 “Fatherland” – 5 Non-faction – 6
Dnipropetrovsk	8 political parties PR – 45 (37.5%) BYuT – 21 (17.5%) Lazarenko Bloc – 17 (14%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (7.5%) OUPS – 8 (6.5%) Viche – 7 (6%) CPU – 7 (6%) Oppositional Bloc ‘Not Sol’ – 6 (5%)	7 political parties PR – 78 (65%) / 50 m.c. SU – 13 (10.8%) / 5 m.c. “Fatherland” – 8 (6.7%) FC – 8 (6.7%) CPU – 6 (5%) / 1 m.c. “Ukraine of the Future” – 4 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. People’s Party – 3 (2.5%) / 3 m.c.	Total: 6 PR – 87 “Freedom” – 7 FC – 8 CPU – 6 “Ukraine of the Future” – 4 Non-faction – 6
Donetsk	2 political parties PR – 68 (84%) Vitrenko Bloc – 13 (16%)	3 political parties PR – 85 (94.4%) / 45 m.c. CPU – 3 (3.3%) SU – 2 (2.2%)	---

Zhytomyr	<p>7 political parties BYuT – 19 (31.67%) OUPS – 12 (20%) PR – 9 (15%) ‘Zhytomyryane’ Bloc – 5 (8.34%) CPU – 5 (8.34%) SPU – 4 (6.67%) PBL – 3 (5%) Vitrenko Bloc – 3 (5%)</p>	<p>12 political parties ‘Fatherland’ – 16 (26.7%) / 9 m.c. PR – 14 (23.3%) / 8 m.c. FC – 10 (16.7%) / 4 m.c. ‘Hometown’ – 8 (13.3%) / 5 m.c. CPU – 2 (3.3%) ‘Youth Party of Ukraine’ – 2 (3.3%) ‘Freedom’ – 2 (3.3%) UDAR – 2 (3.3%) ‘Our Ukraine’ (OU – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. SU – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. ‘Ukrainian platform’ – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Ukrainian Republican Party – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 4 PR – 23 FC – 8 ‘Fatherland’ – 7 Non-faction – 10</p>
Ivano-Frankivsk	<p>8 political parties OUPS – 22 (36.67%) BYuT – 17 (28.34%) Bloc For Anushkevitchus – 9 (15%) PR – 4 (6.67%) UPB Kostenko-Plushch – 3 (5%) ‘IT’S TIME!’ – 3 (5%) URP «Cathedral» – 1 (1.67%) Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN) – 1 (1.67%)</p>	<p>8 political parties ‘Freedom’ – 34 (57.6%) / 24 m.c. FC – 9 (15.4%) / 3 m.c. ‘Fatherland’ – 5 (8.5%) / 1 m.c. PR – 4 (6.8%) / 1 m.c. OU – 2 (3.4%) ‘Third Force’ – 2 (3.4%) UDAR – 2 (3.4%) Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>---*</p>
Zaporizhia	<p>7 political parties PR – 43 (47.7%) BYuT – 15 (16.6%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (10%) CPU – 7 (7.7%)</p>	<p>6 political parties PR – 61 (67.8%) / 42 m.c. ‘Fatherland’ – 13 (14.4%) / 2 m.c. CPU – 8 (8.9%) / 1 m.c. ‘Hometown’ – 3 (3.3%)</p>	<p>Total: 5 PR – 64 Fatherland – 12 CPU – 8 ‘Hometown’ – 3</p>

27 m.c. – majority constituency

Representation of political parties and majority in the City Council			
Regional Administrative Centre	2006	2010	Factions in City Council 2013
Zaporizhia	Reforms and Order Party – 6 (6.7%) Viche – 6 (6.7%) Electoral Bloc “Zaporizhia is our city” – 4 (4.45%)	SU – 3 (3.3%) FC – 2 (2.2%)	FC – 2 Non-faction – 1
Kirovohrad	7 political parties BYuT – 36 (47.37%) PR – 10 (13.16%) OUPS – 9 (11.85%) Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU) – 6 (7.9%) People’s Bloc of Lytvyn (PBL) – 5 (6.58%) CPU – 5 (6.58%) SPU – 5 (6.58%)	10 political parties PR – 40 (52.6%) / 26 m.c. “Fatherland” – 18 (23.7%) / 6 m.c. FC – 7 (9.2%) / 2 m.c. “Women’s Solidarity” – 3 (3.9%) CPU – 2 (2.6%) SPU – 2 (2.6%) People’s Party – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c. “Solidarity” – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c. SU – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c. “Union of Leftists” – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c.	Total: 2 PR – 38 “Fatherland” – 15
Luhansk	4 political parties PR – 61 (80.2%) Vitrenko Bloc – 7 (9.2%) CPU – 4 BYuT – 4	5 political parties PR – 61 (80.3%) / 37 m.c. CPU – 10 (13.2%) SU – 2 (2.6%) FC – 2 (2.6%) USDP – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c.	Total: 3 factions PR – 60 CPU – 8 “For Changes” – 2
Luts'k	6 political parties BYuT – 23 (51%) OUPS – 11 (24%) Bloc “IT’S TIME! -PRP” – 3 (7%)	8 political parties “Fatherland” – 24 (49%) / 16 m.c. “Freedom” – 9 (18.4%) / 4 m.c. “For Ukraine!” – 4 (8.2%) / 2 m.c.	Total: 6 “Fatherland” – 17 “Freedom” – 8 FC – 5

Luts'k	<p>UPB Kostenko-Plushch – 3 (7%) PR – 3 (7%) SPU – 2 (4%)</p> <p>6 political parties OUPS – 32 (35.56%) BYuT – 25 (27.78%) Bloc "IT'S TIME! -PRP" – 11 (12.23%) "Freedom" – 9 (10%) UPB Kostenko-Plushch – 8 (8.89%) Reforms and Order Party – 5 (5.56%)</p>	<p>FC – 4 (8.2%) PR – 3 (6.1%) / 1 m.c. OU – 2 (4.1%) SU – 2 (4.1%) / 1 m.c. "European Party of Ukraine" – 1 (2%)</p> <p>12 political parties "Freedom" – 55 (61.1%) / 37 m.c. FC – 7 (7.8%) / 1 m.c. PR – 6 (6.7%) / 1 m.c. "Cathedral Ukraine" [Ukraina Soborna] – 4 (4.4%) / 2 m.c. "IT'S TIME!" – 3 (3.3%) People's Movement of Ukraine (PMU) [Narodny Rukh Ukrainy] – 3 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. OU – 3 (3.3%) UDAR – 3 (3.3%) Christian Democratic Party (CDP) [Khrystianska Partiya Ukrainy] – 3 (3.3%) Agriculture Party of Ukraine (APU) [Agrarna Partiya Ukrainy] – 1 (1.1%) / 1 m.c. Reforms and Order Party – 1 (1.1%) / 1 m.c. "For Ukraine!" – 1 (1.1%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>PR – 4 OU – 2 "European Party of Ukraine" – 1 Non-fiction – 12</p> <p>Total: 11 "Freedom" – 55 FC – 7 PR – 5 "Cathedral Ukraine" – 4 UDAR – 4 OU – 3 "IT'S TIME!" – 2 CDP – 2 APU – 1 Reforms and Order Party – 1 "For Ukraine!" – 1</p>
Lviv	<p>6 political parties PR – 45 (50%) Vitrenko Bloc – 15 (16.6%) BYuT – 11 (12.23%) Bloc "Mykolayiv for V. Chaykal" – 8 (8.89%) PGU – 7 (7.78%) CPU – 4 (4.45%)</p>	<p>9 political parties PR – 60 (66.7%) / 38 m.c. CPU – 6 (6.7%) FC – 6 (6.7%) / 2 m.c. "Third Force" – 5 (5.6%) "Fatherland" – 4 (4.4%)</p>	<p>Total: 4 PR – 62 (+2 SU) CPU – 6 FC – 6 "Third Force" – 5 Non-fiction – 2</p>
Mykolayiv	<p>6 political parties PR – 45 (50%) Vitrenko Bloc – 15 (16.6%) BYuT – 11 (12.23%) Bloc "Mykolayiv for V. Chaykal" – 8 (8.89%) PGU – 7 (7.78%) CPU – 4 (4.45%)</p>	<p>9 political parties PR – 60 (66.7%) / 38 m.c. CPU – 6 (6.7%) FC – 6 (6.7%) / 2 m.c. "Third Force" – 5 (5.6%) "Fatherland" – 4 (4.4%)</p>	<p>Total: 4 PR – 62 (+2 SU) CPU – 6 FC – 6 "Third Force" – 5 Non-fiction – 2</p>

Representation of political parties and majority in the City Council			
Regional Administrative Centre	2006	2010	Factions in City Council 2013
Mykolajiv		SU – 4 (4.4%) / 2 m.c. PGU – 3 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. “Homeland” – 1 (1.1%) / 1 m.c. “Justice” – 1 (1.1%) / 1 m.c.	Total: 5 PR – 74 “Motherland” – 11 FC – 6CPU – 4 “Green Odesa” – 3 Non-faction – 15
Odesa	7 political parties PR – 38 (31.6%) Hurvits Bloc – 31 (25.8%) Vitrenko Bloc – 15 (12.5%) BYuT – 12 (10%) Oppositional Bloc ‘Not Sol.’ – 10 (8.34%) PBL – 8 (6.67%) SPU – 6 (5%)	9 political parties PR – 69 (57.5%) / 44 m.c. “Motherland” – 15 (12.5%) / 4 m.c. SU – 12 (10%) / 4 m.c. FC – 11 (9.2%) / 1 m.c. CPU – 4 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. “Fatherland” – 4 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. PGU – 3 (2.5%) / 3 m.c. People’s Party – 1 (0.8%) / 1 m.c. “Justice” – 1 (0.8%) / 1 m.c.	Total: 6 “Conscience of Ukraine” – 36 PR – 5 “Fatherland” – 6 FC – 1 CPU – 1 SPU – 1
Poltava	5 political parties BYuT – 19 (38%) PR – 17 (34%) OUPS – 7 (14%) CPU – 4 (8%) SPU – 3 (6%)	6 political parties “Conscience of Ukraine” – 36 (72%) / 23 m.c. PR – 5 (10%) “Fatherland” – 5 (10%) / 1 m.c. FC – 2 (4%) CPU – 1 (2%) SPU – 1 (2%) / 1 m.c.	Total: 10 “Fatherland” – 21 “Freedom” – 6
Rivne	6 political parties BYuT – 17 (32.08%) OUPS – 16 (28.3%)	10 political parties “Fatherland” – 23 (42.6%) / 17 m.c. PR – 6 (11.1%) / 2 m.c.	Total: 10 “Fatherland” – 21 “Freedom” – 6

Rivne	<p>UPB Kostenko-Plushch – 8 (15.1%) PR – 5 (9.44%) SPU – 4 (7.55%) PBL – 3 (5.66%)</p>	<p>“Freedom” – 6 (11.1%) / 1 m.c. OU – 5 (9.3%) / 3 m.c. “All-Ukrainian Patriotic Union” – 4 (7.4%) / 1 m.c. FC – 4 (7.4%) / 1 m.c. People’s Party – 2 (3.7%) / 1 m.c. UDAR – 2 (3.7%) “United Centre” – 1 (1.9%) / 1 m.c. SU – 1 (1.9%)</p>	<p>FC – 4 PR – 4 OU – 4 People’s Party – 2 UDAR – 2 “All-Ukrainian Patriotic Union” – 1 United Centre – 1 SU – 1 Non-fiction – 10</p>
Sevastopol	<p>6 political parties PR – 45 (60%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (12%) Ivanov Bloc “For Sevastopol!” – 7 (9.34%) Russian Bloc – 5 (6.67%) CPU – 5 (6.67%) Kontratskyi Bloc – 4 (5.34%)</p>	<p>8 political parties PR – 46 (60.5%) / 28 m.c. Russian Bloc – 9 (11.8%) / 4 m.c. CPU – 8 (10.5%) / 1 m.c. SU – 4 (5.3%) / 1 m.c. People’s Party – 3 (3.9%) / 3 m.c. PSPU – 3 (3.9%) “Ukrainian Party of Honour, war on corruption and organized crime” – 2 (2.6%) Party of Pensioners of Ukraine – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 6 PR “Region-Sevastopol” – 49 “Russian Bloc” – 8 SU – 3 People’s Party – 3 PSPU – 3 Non-fiction – 2</p>
Simferopol	<p>7 political parties Bloc ‘For Yanukovych!’ – 37 (48.69%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (11.85%) Union Party – 9 (11.85%) CPU – 8 (10.53%) BYuT – 5 (6.58%) Oppositional Bloc ‘Not Sol’ – 4 (5.27%) Crimea Regional Organization PMU – 3 (3.95%)</p>	<p>6 political parties PR – 60 (78.9%) / 37 m.c. CPU – 4 (5.3%) Party “Union” – 4 (5.3%) People’s Movement of Ukraine – 3 (3.9%) / 1 m.c. “Russian Unity” – 3 (3.9%) SU – 2 (2.6%)</p>	<p>Total: 4 PR – 59 “Union” – 4 “Russian Unity” – 3 “Communists” – 4</p>

Representation of political parties and majority in the City Council			
Regional Administrative Centre	2006	2010	Factions in City Council 2013
Sunny	<p>5 political parties BYuT – 36 (48%) Civil Bloc 'Night Watch' (Our Party, LDP, Party of Development, Party of Defence of Human Rights) – 20 (26.67%) OUPS – 11 (14.67%) PR – 4 (5.34%) CPU – 4 (5.34%)</p>	<p>5 political parties "Fatherland" – 36 (47.4%) / 24 m.c. "Hometown" – 24 (31.6%) / 9 m.c. PR – 9 (11.8%) / 4 m.c. FC – 5 (6.6%) / 1 m.c. CPU – 2 (2.6%)</p>	<p>Total: 4 "Fatherland" – 30 "Hometown" – 23 PR – 8 CPU – 2 Non-faction – 4</p>
Ternopil	<p>8 political parties BYuT – 17 (36.6%) OUPS – 15 (28.3%) UPB Kostenko-Plushch – 11 (18.34%) All-Ukrainian Union Freedom – 3 (6.67%) SPU – 3 (5%) "IT'S TIME! -PRP" – 3 (5%) Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (PIEU) [Partiya Promyslovitsiv ta Pidpryyemitsiv Ukrainy] – 2 USDP – 3 Nonpartisan – 2</p>	<p>9 political parties "Freedom" – 31 (51.7%) / 20 m.c. PR – 11 (18.3%) / 5 m.c. OU – 5 (8.3%) / 2 m.c. FC – 3 (5%) "Ukrainian Party" – 3 (5%) / 1 m.c. "Fatherland" – 2 (3.3%) "For Ukraine!" – 2 (3.3%) Ukrainian People's Party (UPP) [Ukrainska Narodna Partiya] – 2 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. "Civic Position" – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 9 "Freedom" – 31 PR – 6 OU – 5 FC – 5 UPP – 2 "Ukrainian Party" – 2 "Civic Position" – 1 "Children's Defence Party" – 1 (Ukrainian Party, m.c.) "Green Planet" – 5 Non-faction – 2</p>
Uzhhorod	<p>6 political parties BYuT – 17 (34%) OUPS – 12 (24%) PBL – 8 (16%) PR – 6 (12%)</p>	<p>12 political parties "United Centere" (EU) [Yedyny Tsentr] – 18 (30%) / 12 m.c. PR – 15 (25%) / 9 m.c. "Fatherland" – 9 (15%) / 2 m.c.</p>	<p>---*</p>

Uzhhorod	<p>“IT’S TIME!” – 4 (8%) SPU – 3 (6%)</p>	<p>FC – 4 (6.7%) / 1 m.c. SU – 3 (5%) / 1 m.c. “KMKS “Party of Hungarians of Ukraine” – 2 (3.3%) People’s Party – 2 (3.3%) / 2 m.c. “Ecological Recovery Party “Eco +25%”” – 2 (3.3%) UDAR – 2 (3.3%) “Youth Party of Ukraine” – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Political Party “The Greens” – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Ukrainian Party – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 3 PR – 72 “Fatherland” – 9 CPU – 8 Non-fiction – 10</p>
Kharkiv	<p>7 political parties PR – 54 (54%) BYuT – 14 (14%) Vitrenko Bloc – 8 (8%) Shumilkin Bloc – 8 (8%) OUPS – 6 (6%) Viche – 5 (5%) CPU – 5 (5%)</p>	<p>7 political parties PR – 69 (69%) / 45 m.c. “Fatherland” – 13 (13%) / 2 m.c. CPU – 8 (8%) SU – 6 (6%) / 1 m.c. FC – 2 (2%) People’s Party – 1 (1%) / 1 m.c. Party of Pensioners of Ukraine – 1 (1%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 7 PR – 49 “Fatherland” – 9 CPU – 6 “Third Force” – 1 “Homeland” – 3 FC – 2 UDAR – 5 Non-fiction – 5</p>
Kherson	<p>7 political parties PR – 22 (28.95%) BYuT – 20 (26.32%) Vitrenko Bloc – 9 (11.85%) Kirichenko Bloc Civil Control – 7 (9.21%) Viche – 5 (6.58%) CPU – 4 (5.27%) PBL – 4 (5.27%)</p>	<p>10 political parties PR – 45 (59.2%) / 30 m.c. “Fatherland” – 9 (11.8%) / 3 m.c. CPU – 6 (7.9%) / 1 m.c. “Third Force” – 4 (5.3%) / 1 m.c. “Homeland” – 3 (3.9%) / 1 m.c. FC – 3 (3.9%) SU – 2 (2.6%) UDAR – 2 (2.6%) People’s Party – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c. “Union of the Leftists” – 1 (1.3%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 7 PR – 49 “Fatherland” – 9 CPU – 6 “Third Force” – 1 “Homeland” – 3 FC – 2 UDAR – 5 Non-fiction – 5</p>

Representation of political parties and majority in the City Council			
Regional Administrative Centre	2006	2010	Factions in City Council 2013
Khmelnytskyi	<p>7 political parties BYuT – 24 (40%) Prytula Bloc – 12 (20%) PBL – 8 (13.34%) Vikarchuk Election Bloc – 5 (8.34%) OUUPS – 4 (6.67%) PR – 4 (6.67%) Bloc 'Hometown-Kolyshchak' – 3 (5%)</p>	<p>10 political parties “Fatherland” – 41 (68.3%) / 24 m.c. PR – 5 (8.3%) / 1 m.c. “Freedom” – 3 (5%) FC – 3 (5%) Political Party of Small and Medium Business of Ukraine – 2 (3.3%) SU – 2 (3.3%) / 1 m.c. UC – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. People’s Party – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Political Party “New Policy” – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Ukrainian People’s party – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 4 “Fatherland” – 28 PR – 7 “Freedom” – 3 FC – 7 Non-faction – 6</p>
Cherkasy	<p>8 political parties BYuT – 26 (43.34%) PR – 8 (13.34%) OUUPS – 8 (13.34%) SPU – 4 (6.67%) CPU – 4 (6.67%) Bulatskyi Bloc – 4 (6.67%) PBL – 3 (5%) Viche – 3 (5%)</p>	<p>9 political parties “Fatherland” – 16 (26.7%) / 9 m.c. Free Democrats – 15 (25%) / 8 m.c. PR – 14 (23.3%) / 7 m.c. FC – 5 (8.3%) / 2 m.c. CPU – 4 (6.7%) / 2 m.c. “All-Ukrainian Political party Ecology and Social Protection” – 2 (3.3%) UDAR – 2 (3.3%) PIEU – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. SPU – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 7 “Free Democrats” – 21 PR – 13 “Fatherland” – 10 FC – 5 “Ecology and Social Protection” – 2 CPU – 3 UDAR – 2 Non-faction – 4</p>

Chernyhi	<p>7 political parties BYuT – 18 (36%) PR – 10 (20%) SPU – 8 (16%) Vitrenko Bloc – 5 (10%) OUPS – 4 (8%) CPU – 3 (6%) Viche – 2 (4%)</p>	<p>7 political parties “Fatherland” – 18 (38%) / 13 m.c. PR – 15 (30%) / 9 m.c. “Civil Solidarity” – 4 FC – 4 (8%) / 1 m.c. CPU – 3 (6%) UDAR – 3 (6%) SU – 2 (4%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 7 PR – 17 “Fatherland” – 13 “Civil Solidarity” – 4 CPU – 3 UDAR – 3 Non-factor – 3</p>
Chernivsi	<p>6 political parties BYuT – 24 (40%) OUPS – 14 (23.34%) PR – 11 (18.34%) Oppositional Bloc ‘Not Sol.’ – 5 (8.34%) SPU – 3 (5%) Viche – 3 (5%)</p>	<p>7 political parties “Fatherland” – 17 (28.3%) / 9 m.c. PR – 16 (26.7%) / 8 m.c. FC – 16 (26.7%) / 7 m.c. OU – 6 (10%) / 4 m.c. “Freedom” – 3 (5%) “Third Force” – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c. Republican Party of Ukraine – 1 (1.7%) / 1 m.c.</p>	<p>Total: 5 PR – 18 FC – 15 “Fatherland” – 14 OU – 6 “Freedom” – 3 Non-factor – 4</p>

* no information on faction list on the official city council website

Though some of the above mentioned political actors succeeded in forming influential factions in Vinnytsa, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Cherkasy City Councils, experts believe that new political projects did not contribute much to structuring of the political space in regions mainly because most of such ‘new’ parties were created solely ‘for the elections’. In the first place, they were meant to support local leaders with a view to their popularity. For example, “Young Ukraine” [Moloda Ukraina] was the project of ex-secretary of Lutsk City Council S. Zelynskyi and “Conscience of Ukraine” was closely related to businessman from Poltava, Head of Inter-Agro Ltd., O.Mamay. In the second place, such parties were supposed to ensure political representation of regional business circles, as happened in the Volyn²⁸, Zakarpattia and Kherson regions²⁹.

More so, analysts consider that increase in the number of electoral subjects yielded minor results. By contrast, in 2006, 16 political parties and 23 blocs represented their interests in 23 regional city councils, in Simferopol and Sevastopol, while in 2010 there were 59 political parties. However, their main task was either to withdraw votes from their principal competitors or to proclaim their political power and demonstrate multiplicity of parties’ principle in full play³⁰.

Another distinction of 2010 the Elections was participation of majoritarian candidates. Predictably, ‘traditional’ actors of the electoral process such as Party of Regions, All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” [Vseukrayinske Obyednannia “Batkivshchyna”]³¹, CPU, People’s Party [Narodna Partiya] and “Our Ukraine”, did their best to put forward as many candidates as possible, using double nomination by party lists and majority constituencies. As a result, Party of Regions won majority of seats in city councils of Dnipropetrovsk (50 out of 60), Donetsk (45 out of 45), Zaporizhia (42 out of 45), Kirovohrad (26 out of 38), Luhansk (37 out of 38), Mykolayiv (38 out of 45), Odesa (44 out of 60), Kharkiv (45 out of 50), Kherson (30 out of 38), Sevastopol, 28 out of 38, and Simferopol, 37 out of 38. The outcome of the elections for the oppositional party of power “Fatherland” was far less boastful: majority in only 4 city councils – Khmelnytskyi 24 out of 30, Lutsk. 16 out of 25, Rivne, 17 out of 27, and Sumy, 24 out of 38. The most distinguished of all the ‘new’ actors in the Ukrainian political space was “Freedom,” which won significant numbers of majoritarian mandates in Ternopil (20 out of 30), Ivano-Frankivsk (24 out of 30), and Lviv, 37 out of 45 city councils, and “Conscience of Ukraine” Party, which won in the single-seat

²⁸ Volyn geographically is located at the Eastern European Plain between the rivers Prypiat and Southern Bug, to the north of Galicia and Podolia.

²⁹ A. Kogut, K Sidash (eds.), *Mistsevi Vybory – 2010. Puls Krainy* [Local Elections – 2010. The Pulse of the Country], Kyiv 2011.

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” is a political party in Ukraine, led by Yulia Tymoshenko.

constituencies of Poltava and Vinnytsa 23 out of 25 in both city councils. (see Table 4).

It should be noted, however, that not all political parties running for office by party lists put up their candidates in majoritarian constituencies. For example, in Donetsk region such parties were “War Children” [Dity Viny], “Justice” [Spravedlyvist], and “The Truth” [Pravda]. Some majoritarian candidates tried not to flaunt or even conceal their party affiliation casting themselves as independent candidates³². One more phenomenon of the 2010 Elections were the registered cases practically in all regions of Ukraine of obtaining mandates by majoritarian candidates while the parties they represented failed to win enough seats to get into the council. The fun fact of the 2010 Elections was the election to Sevastopol City Council a deputy from the Party of Pensioners who at the time of the campaign was ... 25 years old.

Table 4 also demonstrates that the Party of Regions came first in the last elections and won the majority of deputy seats in 9 administrative city councils, as well as Sevastopol and Simferopol. On top of that ‘the ruling party’ was firmly entrenched in regions traditionally opposed to it especially in contrast with 2006 Elections results: in Rivne, Chernyiv, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Uzhhorod, Khmelnytskyi (runner-up), Lviv, and Cherkasy (came third).

Yet, the Party of Regions main opponent – Y. Tymoshenko’s political bloc (BYuT) – All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” – lost its leading position. In comparison, in 2006 BYuT won the majority in 13 city councils (Vinnytsa, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lutsk, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, Uzhhorod, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernivtsy, Chernihiv) and was the second best in 6 more (Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zaporizhia, Lviv, Kharkiv, Kherson), whereas in 2010 “Fatherland” prevailed only in eight city councils (Zhytomyr, Lutsk, Rivne, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernivtsy, Chernihiv) and came second in 4, the gap between PR and BYuT at that was 48 mandates in Zaporizhia, 22 in Kirovohrad, 56 in Kharkiv, and 36 in Kherson. In Poltava and Vinnytsa city councils ‘the ruling party’ and Tymoshenko’s opposition dead heated with five seats on each side.

As to “Our Ukraine” party, led by ex-President V.Yushchenko, it was a fiasco. In 2006, riding on the wave of popularity after the Orange Revolution, in coalition with “People’s Self-Defense” [Narodna Samooborona] (OUPS), it succeeded in 18 city councils. However, in 2010 their strongholds were almost one-third as many: only seven city councils (Ivano-Frankivsk, Zhytomyr, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi). More so, the number of mandates won by this Bloc in 2010 by comparison with 2006 was reduced by nine times, 24 and 214 respectively.

³² A. Kogut, K Sidash (eds.), *Mistsevi Vybory – 2010 ...*

Analysts perceive several reasons for the success of Party of Regions in the South-East and its advance to Central and Western Ukraine. Being an officially ‘ruling party’, ‘regionals’ (members of the Party of Regions) had a firm starting position and unlimited administrative resources. Moreover, after the adoption of the “Law on Elections” many local leaders, even those who used to actively support the opposition, joined the Party of Regions. A new regulation on Territorial Electoral Commissions (TEC) to be formed on the basis of Verkhovna Rada party structure where the majority of seats were occupied by ruling parties also contributed to the triumph of the Party of Regions. For example, in Zakarpattia nine out of 19 TEC chairmen were members of PR, whereas “Fatherland” did not get any position in the commission. In Kherson 33% of the senior positions belonged to the ‘regionals’, while “Fatherland” got only 21%. In the electoral commissions of ARC³³ the Crimea People’s Movement of Ukraine was not represented at all³⁴.

The disappointment of many Ukrainians in the ‘orange team’ and the political parties associated with it paid handsome political dividends to the ‘ruling party’ as well.

Party of Regions also benefited from the regulation stipulated by the new Law on the ban for political blocs to participate in the election campaign. As a result, the popular Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko had to run in the elections as a less recognizable “Fatherland” party, and minor parties from the bloc were forced to fight for the mandates on their own.

Election of local councils on party basis suggests formation of party factions after the elections. In 2007, after considerable debate the Verkhovna Rada amended the Law on the Status of Deputies of the Local Councils by introducing the imperative mandate. According to this regulation the term of office for a Deputy could be terminated without the approval of the respective council if the deputy did not join any political faction in the respective council or withdrew from the faction by self-action or switched the deputy factions or on any other grounds established by the authorities of the political bloc the deputy represented in the elections³⁵. This innovation met with a mixed reaction of many politicians and particularly of members of the ruling Party of Regions who not only struggled for parliamentary majority but also aimed for political leverage in local councils. Eventually, the ‘regionals’ succeeded in editing the Law “On the Status of Deputies of the Local Councils” (N 2487-VI от 10.07.2010), and all the above-

³³ ARC – Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

³⁴ A. Kogut, K Sidash (eds.), *Mistsevi Vybory – 2010...*

³⁵ O. Konotopsev, *Imperatyvnyy Mandat v Mistsevykh Radakh: Polityko-Pravovuy Analiz ta Praktychni Aspekty Zastosuvannya* [The Imperative Mandate in Local Councils: Political and Law Analysis and Practical Aspects], «Derzhavne Budivnytstvo» 2009, № 1, <http://www.kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/db/2009-1/doc/4/03.pdf>, 15.04.2014.

mentioned regulations were eliminated. Thereby legitimizing the phenomenon of deputy migrations³⁶.

Ukrainian political vocabulary has been enriched lately with a new notion – a ‘Turncoat’. This is the name for deputies who in order to accommodate the political climate or just for money withdraw from the faction they represented as candidates in the elections. This term can also be referred to deputies who, while voting for significant issues, cast their vote in favour of the factions to which they do not belong.

The fire-brands of turncoats are I.Rybakov who was elected from BYuT and Yu.But who got the seat in Verkhovna Rada from OUPS. On June 6, 2008 they announced their two members short, less than 226, for the required number and consequently split³⁷.

Unfortunately, local councils likewise went through the process of political migrations. Table 4 displays the change of the political environment in local councils from the period right after the elections of November 2010 to mid-July 2013: Party of Regions faction increased its representation in 10 administrative centres due to the ‘infusion’ of the deputies, most of whom stood for ‘Strong Ukraine’ during the elections. Zhytomyr City Council became an exception to the rule with the turncoats who enlarged ‘ruling party’ faction from 14 to 23 members coming from “Fatherland,” “Front for Change” and “Hometown.”

During the two and a half years from the elections the number of “Fatherland” faction has reduced in 12 city councils, with the most significant loss registered in Khmelnytskyi (minus 13 deputies), Zhytomyr (minus 9), Lutsk (minus 7), Sumy (minus 6), Cherkasy (minus 6) city councils. The exodus from this faction, in our opinion, could be conditioned not only by “fat cats» in the party lists, whose main interest is not reputation but business issues, but also by the arrest of the “Fatherland” leader Yulia Tymoshenko in August 2011.

Time-tested and stable in their number for now are the “Conscience of Ukraine” faction in Poltava and Vinnytsa city councils and “Freedom” in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil city councils.

Table 4 also shows that there are fewer deputies in some party factions than got into the city council by that party list. At that, some parties even could not or would not form factions in city councils. It is interesting to note a great number of non-faction deputies in some city councils: 15 in Odesa, 12 in Lutsk, and 10 in Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kharkiv.

³⁶ Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Zakon Ukrainy Pro Vnesennya Zmin do Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro Status Deputativ Mistevyx Rad,”* [Law of Ukraine About Making Changes in the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of Deputies of Local Councils”], 2010, № 35-36, art. 491, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/93-15>, 15.04.2014.

³⁷ *Wikipedia*, “Tushka” [Turncoat], <http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Тушка>, 15.04.2014.

In June 2013 Ukrainian opposition officially united. In the Resolution of “Front for Change” Congress Yatsenyuk Party declared their liquidation. All the members of the party announced their decision to join “Fatherland”. Similar declarations were made by “Reforms and Order” Party, ideologically aligned to “Fatherland.” However, the decision to unite the factions of these political parties in local government authorities was not heartily welcomed in the regions. According to famous magazine Forbes, only 1,777 members (8.4%) of Yatsenyuk Party out of the total 21,070 joined ex-Prime minister’s associates by the beginning of August 2013. The final merger of the oppositional forces was expected to be complete by October-November 2013³⁸ but the situation that developed after President Yanukovich refused to sign the agreement to join the European Union in November 2013, suspended the process. Euromaidan and the Russian annexation of Crimea, along with Putin’s attempt to redraw the map of Ukraine changed the political climate not only at the local level, but in the whole country now and for the foreseeable future.

One of the greatest pitfalls for local councils after 2006 Elections, hampering their work, was the previously mentioned confrontation between the party majority and chiefly nonpartisan mayors. Some of the theoreticians saw a way to avoid conflicting and strained situations in local government by canceling self-nomination. They claimed that in case a city mayor ran as a candidate from some political party, he would be supported by his fellow party members, which would contribute to his efficient work³⁹.

Law rule, which stated party nomination of candidates for a city mayor, compelled most mayors-managers to search for party ‘residential registration’. Evolution of city mayors’ political preferences is demonstrated in Table 5.

The table shows that 13 mayors of regional administrations were re-elected in 2010 and half of them refused the support of political parties that ensured their victory in the previous elections. Many mayors joined ‘the party of power’ in August-September 2010 to secure their position for the next term⁴⁰. As a result, 3,702 (32.17%) of heads of village, settlement, and city councils including 10 heads of regional centers (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad,

³⁸ *Za Yatsenyukom k Tymoshenko Ushel Tolko Kazhduy 12 chlen “Fronta Zmin”* [For Yatsenyuk to Tymoshenko Left Only One in Twelve Member of “Front Zmin”], Forbes. Ukraine 2013, August 15, <http://forbes.ua/nation/1356661-za-yacenyukom-k-tymoshenko-ushel-tolko-kazhdyj-12-j-chlen-fronta-zmin>, 15.04.2014.

³⁹ *Zakon Pro Mistsevi Vybyry: Udar Po Mistsevomy Samovryaduvannyu chy Yogo Posylennya?* [Law of Ukraine on the Local Elections: Impact on Local Government or Strengthen it?], Glavkom 2010 August 2, <http://glavkom.ua/articles/1420.html>, 15.04.2014.

⁴⁰ *Sche Try Mery Vstupyly do Partii Regioniv* [Three New Mayors Joined the Party of Regions], Zaxid.Net 2010, August 9, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?shhe_triberi_vstupili_do_lav_partiyi_regioniv&objectId=1108623, 15.04.2014.

Table 5. Mayors of Regional Administrative Centre in 2006 and 2010

Regional Administrative Centre	Mayor	
	2006 Political parties, which gave support in the elections	2010 Party affiliation
Vinnitsa	Volodymyr Hroisman, acting Mayor of Vinnitsa since 2005, OUPS	Volodymyr Hroisman , Mayor, “ Conscience of Ukraine Party ”
Dnipropetrovsk	Ivan Kulichenko , Mayor since 1999, non-partisan, BYuT and SPU	Ivan Kulichenko , PR, Dnipropetrovsk Mayor
Donetsk	Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, Mayor since 2002, PR	Oleksandr Lukyanchenko , PR, Mayor
Zhytomyr	Vira Sheludchenko, OUPS (later ‘United Centre’)	Volodymyr Deboy , PR, Deputy Head of Zhytomyr Regional Administration
Ivano-Frankivsk	Viktor Anushkevitchus, director of ‘Ritas’ private enterprise, chairman of regional committee of Ukrainian People’s Party, supported by UPB Kostenko-Plushch	Viktor Anushkevitchus , member of Ukrainian People’s Party , Mayor
Zaporizhia	Yevhen Kartashov, Mayor since 2003, self-nomination, PR member: was expelled in October, 2006, then reinstated and expelled again in November 2006	Oleksandr Syn , CEO adviser of CJSC «Zaporizhia Automobile Building Plant», since April 2012 Head of City Committee of “ Fatherland ”. In March 2012 Oleksandr Syn joined Party of Regions
Kirovohrad	Valeriy Kalchenko, Deputy Minister of Emergencies of Ukraine, BYuT (refused his position in favor of the seat in Verkhovna Rada, May 25, 2006) Volodymyr Puzakov, People’s Deputy of Ukraine, First Secretary of Kirovohrad Regional Committee of CPU, supported by CPU, BYuT (elected November 26, 2006, officially appointed February 1, 2007)	Oleksands Sainsus , nonpartisan, First Deputy of the Head of Kirovohrad Regional Administration, was promoted by PR.
Luhansk	Serhiy Kravchenko , Chairman of Luhansk Regional Committee of PR	Serhiy Kravchenko , Mayor, PR
Lutsk	Bohdan Shyba , First Deputy Chairman of Volyn Regional State Administration, member of BYuT	Mykola Romaniuk , Ex-Head of Volyn Regional Administration, Manager of regional Branch of Privat-Bank. Deputy of four Volyn Regional councils. In the 5 th City Council represents Our Ukraine faction. Promoted as mayor by Strong Ukraine

Regional Administrative Centre	Mayor	
	2006 Political parties, which gave support in the elections	2010 Party affiliation
Lviv	Andriy Sadovyi , founder of TV and radio company Lux and daily newspaper Postup, Leader of non-governmental organization Samopomich, supported by OUPS and ' It is time – ROP '. A long time member of Our Ukraine, was expelled on June 27, 2009 from Party Committee at the Congress of Our Ukraine party	Andriy Sadovyi , Mayor, nonpartisan, Republican Christian Party
Mykolayiv	Volodymyr Chayka, Mayor since 2000, nonpartisan, supported by PR, BYuT, SPU	Volodymyr Chayka , Mayor, PR , died on March 2, 2013. Vacant appointment at present
Odesa	Eduard Hurvits, Our Ukraine, 1994-1998 – Mayor, 2002-2005 – People's Deputy of 4 th Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada from Viktor Yushchenko Bloc, backed up by OUPS	Oleksiy Kotusev , Head of the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine, PR
Poltava	Anatoliy Kukoba, Mayor since 1990. For several years coordinated mayor position with Deputy Seat in Verkhovna Rada. In 2006 had to refused mayor position in favor of Deputy seat (number 98 from Party of Regions) Andriy Matkovskiy, Deputy Manager of regional branch of PrivatBank, Deputy of Poltava 5 th City Council from BYuT. Elected as Mayor on November 26, 2006	Oleksandr Mamay , Director of LLC Inter-Agro, nonpartisan, Conscience of Ukraine Party . Joined PR in July 2012
Rivne	Viktor Chayka, Mayor since 1998, OUPS (died in February 2008) Volodymyr Khomko , Director of Rivneoblvodokanal (Municipal Enterprise of Water Supply and Waste Water Treatment). Elected Mayor on November 30, 2008. Backed up by Reforms and Order , PGU , UPP	Volodymyr Khomko , Mayor, nonpartisan, All-Ukrainian Patriotic Union
Sumy	Hennadiy Minaev , in 1994-2005 – co-founder and Manager of research and production association 'Computing and IT Technologies', in 2005 became Head of Sumy Regional Committee of Civil Group 'Night watch'	Hennadiy Minaev , Mayor, nonpartisan, ' Hometown ' political party
Ternopil	Roman Zastavnyi, Chairman of the Management Board of LLC 'Ternopil Poultry Farm, member of OUPS, supported by SPU and Non-governmental organization 'It's Time'	Serhiy Nadal , Deputy Head of All-Ukrainian Union 'Freedom'

Regional Administrative Centre	Mayor	
	2006 Political parties, which gave support in the elections	2010 Party affiliation
Uzhhorod	Serhiy Ratushnyak, in 2002-2006 was Deputy of 4th Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, Member of VR Committee on Legal Policy. Was member of factions and groups For United Ukraine, People's Power, Democratic Initiatives, Our Ukraine, Regions of Ukraine (was expelled from the latter for disregard of faction discipline), People's Party. At the time of Elections was Head of Regional Committee of Bloc of Volodymyr Lytvyn)	Viktor Pohorilov , member of " Ecological Recovery Party "Eco+25%" "
Kharkiv	Mikhail Dobkin , People's Deputy, PR	Hennadiy Kernes , Kharkiv City Council Secretary, acting Mayor, member of PR
Kherson	Volodymyr Saldo, Mayor since 2002, Head of PR City Committee	Volodymyr Saldo , Mayor, PR Since 2012 People's Deputy of 7 th Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Deputy Head of the Committee on Construction, Housing, Utilities and Regional Policy). Vacant appointment at present
Khmelnyskyi	Serhiy Melnik , Deputy Head of Khmelnytskyi Regional Administration, member of « Fatherland » since 2005	Serhiy Melnik , Mayor, « Fatherland »
Cherkasy	Mayor not elected at the time of elections. Serhiy Odarych , in 2005-2006 was President of Ukrainian-Italian Joint Venture 'Veneto', member of BYuT . Elected Mayor on November 5, 2006	Serhiy Odarych , Mayor, Free Democrats Party , dismissed on April 24, 2013 Vacant appointment at present
Chernihiv	Mykola Rudkivskyi, SPU (refused his position in favor of the seat in Verkhovna Rada) Oleksandr Sokolov, Mayor since 2002, nonpartisan, supported by PR (November 2006)	Oleksandr Sokolov, Mayor since 2002, member of PR
Chernivtsi	Mykola Fedoruk , Mayor since 1994, nonpartisan, supported up by BYuT	Mykola Fedoruk , Mayor, Unity Party Dismissed on March 31, 2011 Vacant appointment at present

Luhansk, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernihiv) were elected from Party of Regions. In contrast, All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” as a prime opponent to Party of Regions managed to get 11 times less seats with a total of 328 (2.85%) and only 2 of them in regional centers (Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi). The total in Ukraine heads of councils of all levels represented 67 parties, 43 of which managed to seat between 1 to 5 officials. However, the real phenomenon of the 2010 Local Elections became the fact that eight mayors of regional centers, five of which were incumbents, were elected from marginal parties: “Conscience of Ukraine” – Vinnytsa and Poltava, Republican Christian Party [Respublykanska Khrystianska Partiya] – Lviv, “Hometown” – Sumy, All-Ukrainian Patriotic Union – Rivne, “Ecological Recovery Party “Eco +25%”” – Uzhhorod, Party of Free Democrats – Cherkasy, Unity [Yedynstvo] – Chernivtsi⁴¹. Thus, in 23 regional administrations out of 24,⁴² 10 Mayor seats were occupied by representatives of Party of Regions, 2 – by All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland,” 3 – by such significant Ukrainian political players as Ukrainian People’s Party [Ukrainska Narodna Partiya]⁴³, “Strong Ukraine” and All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom,” and 8 – by obscure political parties, which if even had run in the elections before, never won more than 0.2% of votes⁴⁴.

What made popular politicians stand as candidates from unpopular parties? We believe there could be several explanations.

Some of the candidates/mayors refused Party of Regions membership card on considerations of principle, as for example, did the serving Lviv Mayor A. Sadovyi⁴⁵.

Sometimes the refusal to join the party of power was preceded by conflicts between mayors and heads of regional administration as it happened in Cherkasy with the Mayor Serhii Odarych and the Governor Serhii Tulub⁴⁶.

It is no secret that a leader’s personality is more influential in local elections than the rating of a political party supporting him. The results of 2006 Local Elections prove this fact. Many seats in city councils were taken by members of local party blocs: “For Anushkevitchus” (Ivano-Frankivsk), “Mykolayiv for

⁴¹ A. Kogut, K Sidash (eds.), *Mistsevi Vybory – 2010 ...*

⁴² City Mayor Elections in Kyiv were not held in 2010.

⁴³ Leader Yuri Kostenko.

⁴⁴ It was the result of Party of Free Democrats in 2007.

⁴⁵ *Mer Lvova Otkazalsya Vstupat v Partiyu Regionov* [Mayor of Lvov Refused to Join the Party of Regions], Glavkom 2010, August 11, <http://glavkom.ua/news/18867.html>, 15.04.2014.

⁴⁶ *Sergey Odarych: Levochkin Prosil Menya Sdelat Vse Dlya Pobedy Cheloveka Firtasha* [Sergey Odarych: Levochkin Asked Me to Help Firtash’s “The Protégé” to Win], *Ukrainskaya Pravda* 2013, May 29, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2013/05/29/6990962/>, 15.04.2014.

V. Chayka!,” Eduard Hurvits Bloc “Our Odesa,”” Shumilkin Bloc (Kharkiv), etc. A ban for political blocs to run for office in 2010 resulted in the so-called substitution effect⁴⁷. Deprived of the opportunity to found their personalized Blocs, charismatic leaders began to ‘crush down’ marginal parties. This was true for not only serving mayors but also oppositional candidates. This process was mutually beneficial as politicians could use obscure parties to appeal to their narrow electoral segment, while little-known parties could promote their brand and advance in power.

Analysis of the data displayed in the table brings us to the conclusion that election of the councils and their heads based on party lists failed to prevent inboard conflicts in the local authorities.

In March 2011 Chernivtsy Mayor Mykola Fedoruk, who had won local elections five times, was dismissed from his position. Fedoruk’s early termination of authorities was favored by two thirds of the City Council deputies, including All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” – a political party which actively supported him in 2006 Elections. Deputies motivated their decision by the Mayor’s inactivity, systematic violation of Constitution and Ukrainian laws, misuse of authority and stimulation of corruption in public utility companies⁴⁸.

In April 2013 Mayor of Cherkasy S. Odarych was impeached. His resignation was favoured by 40 out of the 60 deputies of the City Council. The cause for the conflict between the Mayor and the deputies was City Council’s decision to dismiss members of Executive Committee, which S. Odarych refused to ratify⁴⁹.

It is interesting to note that in both cases, voting for the Mayor’s resignation united oppositional factions and ruling Party of Regions.

Constant confrontation between the Mayor and deputies, mainly from “Freedom” faction virtually paralyzed the activity of Lviv City Council⁵⁰.

Twice after the elections a no-confidence motion was passed against Ivano-Frankivsk Mayor V. Anushkevichus, and twice it was initiated by “Freedom” fac-

⁴⁷ In economic theory substitution effect is defined as the change of the rate of consumption as a result of change of price of the good compared to the price of other goods. According to the substitution effect consumers will substitute away from higher priced goods and services, choosing less costly alternatives. For example, a cut in price for chicken meat will increase its consumption compared with beef and pork.

⁴⁸ *Chernovtsy Ostalis Bez Mera* [Chernovtsy Left Without Mayor], LB.ua. 2011, March 31, http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/31/90696_chernovtsi_ostalis_bez_mera.html?utm_source=lbua&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=more, 15.04.2014.

⁴⁹ *“Batkivshchyna” Obedinilas s Partiy Regionov, Chtoby Svergnut Mera Cherkass* [“Batkivshchyna” Merged With the Party of Regions to Overthrow the Mayor of Cherkassy], Korrespondent.EU 2013, April 25, <http://korrespondent.eu/politika/politika/668736>, 15.04.2014.

⁵⁰ *“Svobodnye” Manevry* [“Freedom” Maneuvers], Delovaya Stolitsa 2011, October 16, <http://www.dsnews.ua/policy/art47515.html>, 15.04.2014.

tion. The latest conflict (December 2012 – June 2013) was triggered by appointment of the new City Council Executive Committee, in which “Freedom” faction laid claim to a majority of seats, and nearly ended in the Mayor’s impeachment. Experts consider that provided “Freedom” has not in the long run gained the majority in the City Council, taking into account high ambitions of this political power, Ivano-Frankivsk is sure to face next Mayor – Deputy Corps opposition in the near future⁵¹.

Thus, it is obvious that neither the Proportional, nor Majoritarian system succeeded in promoting an efficient model of local government in Ukraine. On the contrary, ‘overpartization’ (excessive partization) of local councils estranged deputies from voters even more and paved the way for constant conflicts both within the councils and between mayors and deputy majority.

Involvement of political parties in the work of local government did not enhance the level of credibility to both.

A Sociology survey conducted by The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Centre in May 2013 reveals that 47.3% of respondents do not trust local authorities and 69.2% do not trust political parties⁵².

In our opinion, elections held on the Majoritarian-Proportional basis with open preferential lists would be the best choice for Ukraine. Such a system will preserve the principle of political representation and at the same time maintain contact between voters and deputies of the local council. Such a system will not only encourage transparency of the party activity and effective party cadre but will make it possible for the voters to give their votes not for the candidates of a particular party but in favour of particular candidates on the list, electing them to local authorities.

We believe that restitution of the right for non-partisan candidates to run for mayor and local office as self-nominees and admission of political blocs to the elections, with electoral threshold being made level for them, will also enhance the efficiency of local government.

⁵¹ “Svoboda” vs Mer. *Rakhunok 1:1* [“Freedom” vs Mayor. Score 1:1], Zbruc 2013, June 7, <http://zbruc.eu/node/8531>, 15.04.2014.

⁵² *Riven Doviry Gromadyan do Sotsialnykh ta Derzhavnykh Instytutiv* [Level of Public Trust in Social and Government Institutions], InfoLight 2013, August 5, <http://infolight.org.ua/charts/riven-doviri-gromadyan-do-socialnih-ta-derzhavnih-institutiv>, 15.04.2014.

ABSTRACT

The political system of Ukraine is currently undergoing social modernization and radical transformation. One of the most important problems facing the country is the development of an efficient system of local governance. Unfortunately, over 20 years of independence, Ukraine has failed to develop and adopt a model of local government that would be suitable for national conditions. During this time the structure of local governments, like the overall political structure in Ukraine, has been changed several times. Ukraine is struggling through a period where each election brings different election law and procedures. How have different electoral systems impacted Ukrainian local elections? What kind of electoral system on the local level would work in Ukraine better? This paper will treat these questions in greater details.

Bibliography

- Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Zakon Ukrainy Pro Vnesennya Zmin do Zakonu Ukrainy "Pro Status Deputativ Mistevykh Rad,"* [Law of Ukraine About Making Changes in the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of Deputies of Local Councils"], 2005, № 51, art.552, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi>, 15.04.2014.
- O. Yatsunska, *Will New Electoral System Lead to the Revolution of the Local Government in Ukraine?*, «Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe» 2006, №6, Vol.21.
- O. Yatsunska, *Less Than They Promised: Unexpected Consequences of the Reform of Local Self-government in Ukraine*, «The Crossroads, The Journal for the Studies of East European Borderland» 2012, № 3–4.
- O. Yatsunska, *Nikolaev ot Perestroyki k Nezavisimosti: Istoriko-Politicheckiy Analiz* [Nikolaev From Perestroyka to Independence: Historical and Political Analysis], Nikolaev VART, Shamray 2008.
- V. Melnichenko, *Prymysova Partyzatsiya Mistsevogo Samovryaduvannya: Sutnist, Prychyny, Naslidky* [Forced Partization of Local Government: The Nature, Causes, Consequences], «Ukrainskiy Sotsium. Naukovy Zhurnal» 2010, № 4, pp. 187–200.
- Partiyna Systema Ukrainy: Osoblyvosti Stanovlennya, Problemy Funktsionuvannya, Tendentsii Evolyutsii* [Party System of Ukraine: The Peculiarities of Formation, Functioning Problems, Trends of Evolution], «Natsionalna Bezpeka I Oborona» 2010, № 5, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD116_ukr_1.pdf, 15.04.2014.

- Vybory – Partii – Politychni Rukhi* [Elections – Parties – Political Movements], «Laboratoriya Zakonodavchykh Initsiatyv», [http://parlament.org.ua/upload/docs/KD-7\(ALI\).pdf](http://parlament.org.ua/upload/docs/KD-7(ALI).pdf), 15.04.2014.
- Yu. Yakymenko, *Gromadska Dumka Yak Faktor Evolyutsii Partiinoi Systemy Ukrainy* [Public Opinion as a Factor of Evolution of the Party System of Ukraine], Tsentrazumkova 2010, July 16, http://www.uceps.org/upload/yakymenko_parties_public_op.pdf, 15.04.2014.
- A. Kogut, K Sidash (eds.), *Mistsevi Vybory – 2010. Puls Krainy* [Local Elections – 2010. The Pulse of the Country], Kyiv, 2011.
- O. Konotopsev, *Imperatyvnyy Mandat v Mistsevykh Radakh: Polityko-Pravovyy Analiz ta Praktychni Aspekty Zastosuvannya* [The Imperative Mandate in Local Councils: Political and Law Analysis and Practical Aspects], «Derzhavne Budivnytstvo» 2009, № 1, <http://www.kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/db/2009-1/doc/4/03.pdf>, 15.04.2014.
- Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Zakon Ukrainy Pro Vnesennyya Zmin do Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro Status Deputativ Mistevykh Rad,”* [Law of Ukraine About Making Changes in the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of Deputies of Local Councils”], 2010, № 35–36, art.491, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/93-15>, 15.04.2014.
- Zakon Pro Mistsevi Vybory: Udar Po Mistsevomy Samovryaduvannyu chy Yogo Posylennya?* [Law of Ukraine on the Local Elections: Impact on Local Government or Strengthen it?], Glavkom 2010 August 2, <http://glavcom.ua/articles/1420.html>, 15.04.2014.
- Sche Try Mery Vstupyly do Partii Regioniv* [Three New Mayors Joined the Party of Regions], Zaxid.Net 2010, August 9, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?shhe_tri_meri_vstupili_do_lav_partiyi_regioniv&objectId=1108623, 15.04.2014.
- Mer Lvova Otkazalsya Vstupat v Partiyu Regionov* [Mayor of Lvov Refused to Join the Party of Regions], Glavkom 2010, August 11, <http://glavcom.ua/news/18867.html>, 15.04.2014.
- Sergey Odarych: Levochkin Prosil Menya Sdelat Vse Dlya Pobedy Cheloveka Firtasha* [Sergey Odarych: Levochkin Asked Me to Help Firtash’s “The Protégé” to Win], Ukrainskaya Pravda 2013, May 29, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2013/05/29/6990962/>, 15.04.2014.
- Chernovtsy Ostalis Bez Mera* [Chernovtsy Left Without Mayor], LB.ua. 2011, March 31, http://lb.ua/news/2011/03/31/90696_chernovtsi_ostalis_bez_mera.html?utm_source=lbua&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=more, 15.04.2014.
- “Batkivshchyna” Obedinilas s Partiyey Regionov, Chtoby Svergnut Mera Cherkass* [“Batkivshchyna” Merged With the Party of Regions to Overthrow the

Mayor of Cherkassy], *Korrespondent.EU* 2013, April 25, <http://korrespondent.eu/politika/politika/668736>, 15.04.2014.

“*Svobodnye*” *Manevry* [“Freedom” Maneuvers], *Delovaya Stolitsa* 2011, October 16, <http://www.dsnews.ua/policy/art47515.html>, 15.04.2014.

“*Svoboda*” vs *Mer. Rakhunok 1:1* [“Freedom” vs Mayor. Score 1:1], *Zbruc* 2013, June 7, <http://zbruc.eu/node/8531>, 15.04.2014.

Riven Doviry Gromadyan do Sotsialnykh ta Derzhavnykh Instytutiv [Level of Public Trust in Social and Government Institutions], *InfoLight* 2013, August 5, <http://infolight.org.ua/charts/riven-doviri-gromadyan-do-socialnih-ta-derzhavnih-institutiv>, 15.04.2014.